Non-resident Citizens
Voting rights for expatriates are more common than for non-citizen residents. I have not been able to compile a global survey of countries that permit their emigrants to cast votes and will instead mention some illustrative examples.' Although formal rights of this kind exist in a large number of countries (among the old 15 Member States of the European Union only Ireland and Greece have no voting rights for expatriates), their significance varies considerably and depends on accessibility, the percentage of expatriates in the total citizen population, and participation rates among the eligible expatriates. Some countries, such as Israel or Nicaragua, demand that expatriates must travel to their country of citizenship in order to cast their votes on election day. Most Latin American countries require them to visit a consulate or embassy in their country of residence (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Honduras, and Venezuela). The U.S., Canada, and several European states (e.g., Austria, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg) have instead increased accessibility through absentee ballots sent by mail. Another obstacle for many expatriates is the need to register some time before the vote. Even highly accessible modes of expatriate voting may, however, be of little relevance for election campaigns and outcomes where there are few emigrants or where they feel too disconnected to get involved.
Voting rights for expatriates are often attached to conditions of former residence in the country of citizenship or expire after a certain time of residence abroad. Many countries, however, (e.g., Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain) enfranchise even citizens who have lived all their lives abroad.
A rather exceptional way of mobilizing the expatriate vote and emphasizing its importance is to give it special representation in parliament. Extending voting rights to citizens abroad, just as granting them to non-citizen residents, is, of course, also often motivated by the interests of political parties who hope that expatriates will support them more often than their competitors. In Austria, for example, the law introducing absentee ballots in 1990 was sponsored by the conservative Peoples' Party, whereas the social democratic majority in Vienna adopted a local franchise for non-EU immigrants in Vienna in 2003 that was overturned by the Constitutional Court in 2004.
Non-citizen Residents
The complementary phenomenon of voting rights for non-citizens is less widespread and is more often regarded as an irregular- Apart from these four motives that refer to different visions of political community, there are two reasons that seem to be fairness-based. One is a principle of reciprocity that operates within the European Union but is also applied to non-EU nationalities in Spain and Portugal. The other is a principle of compensation for blocked access to naturalization, which was a main motive for introducing a local suffrage in Estonia in 1996 to accommodate the large Russian minority. At closer inspection, both ideas appear rather suspect. Reciprocity is an important principle for international rights of non-citizens (e.g., to diplomatic protection), but it is not a relevant consideration when considering which residents qualify for political participation in domestic institutions. Why should the very few Norwegians in Portugal have a better claim than much larger immigrant populations from African countries? Neither can granting a local franchise to non-citizens justify denying them access to full citizenship.
Arguments for and against Expansive Citizenship
Which general ideas support or reject electoral rights beyond territory and beyond citizenship? I will sketch four contrasting ideal-typical positions, which emerge from combining positive and negative answers, but will argue that each is defective.
(1) A traditional republican position must reject both types of enlarged citizenship. Its conception of the polity emphasizes territorial boundaries as well as those of membership. Only citizens who are present in the polity can govern themselves by participating in making its laws. Voting rights must be an exclusive privilege of citizens. Finally, a republican polity will be open to newcomers, but can freely determine through its own laws whom to admit.
(2) Ethnic nationalism supports the inclusion of expatriates but rejects political rights for non-citizen residents. It conceives of the nation as a community of culture, imagined descent, and destiny that has a right to self-determination. A nation's membership need not coincide with the resident population of a state where this nation is dominant. It is therefore imperative to include external citizens in national self-government and legitimate to exclude non-citizens who have not assimilated into the national community.
(1) (2) civic ethnic republicanism nationalism (3) (4) territorial affected inclusion interests (3) Voting rights for non-citizens can be derived from two principles of liberal democracy. The first may be called territorial inclusion. It regards a democratic polity as a community of individuals who are subjected to the same political authority and its laws and who have therefore equal rights to representation and participation in the making of these laws. Every permanent resident in a territorial jurisdiction should therefore enjoy voting rights. This may be achieved either by automatic naturalization of all who have legally resided in the country for a certain number of years (Rubio-Marin 2000) or by disconnecting electoral rights from formal citizenship status. From this perspective, voting rights for expatriates are certainly not required and may even be seen as undermining the integrity of the democratic process since those who live permanently abroad should not be able to influence the making of laws to which only internal residents will be subjected (L6pez-Guerra 2005) .
(4) The alternative liberal principle is "quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur" (what affects all shall be approved by all). Ian Shapiro suggests that this principle of affected interests requires "defining the demos decision by decision rather than people by people" (2003, 222) . This view naturally leads to including resident non-citizens in elections, but it also may be invoked by expatriates if some of their vital interests are affected by political decisions taken in their country of original citizenship. A principle of affected interests may even justify voting rights for non-citizen non-residents when the decisions of governments profoundly impact on the interests of other countries' populations. One difficulty with this idea is that most elections in representative democracies are not decisions about specific laws (i.e., referenda) but decisions about who will enjoy general powers of law-making and enforcement within an already given polity. A principle of affected interests can therefore not overcome the need to define the territorial and membership boundaries of the demos.
As an alternative I propose a fifth principle that I call stakeholder citizenship. It combines insights from republican and liberal perspectives. From the former it retains the idea that citizenship is a status of full membership in a self-governing polity and that voting rights should generally be attached to such status. From the latter it derives a principle of inclusion that would give stakeholders a subjective claim to membership and electoral rights. Stakeholdership should, however, be less vague and overinclusive than affected interests. It is best described as expressing an interest in membership that makes an individual's fundamental rights dependent on protection by a particular polity and that ties an individual's well-being to the common good of that polity. Stakeholdership would require the political inclusion of immigrants, but-different from inclusion derived from mere territorial subjection-it could justify a condition of long-term residence and the common requirement that immigrants have to apply for naturalization instead of being automatically turned into citizens. Stakeholdership would also permit (although probably not require) extending the vote to expatriates, but it would exclude those who have never lived in the country and would not give Notes * Special thanks to Harald Waldrauch from whose ongoing research on the rights and legal statuses of migrants this essay has greatly benefited.
1. For a comprehensive analysis of expatriate voting in Latin American access to citizenship to persons whose interests lie in economic investment or tax evasion but who do not take up permanent residence. The idea of stakeholder citizenship becomes even more distinct from the four positions sketched above when we apply it to a pluralistic conception of political community. In a traditional republican or ethnonationalist view, individuals cannot be loyal to several states. The liberal perspective of territorial inclusion, too, tends to ignore external attachments of citizenship. Yet migrants certainly often have relevant stakes in more than one polity. These can be expressed through either multiple citizenship or a combination of expatriate voting rights with denizenship in the country of settlement.
Stakeholder citizenship allows not only for overlapping membership, but also for nested membership in polities contained within larger polities. The republican, ethnonationalist, and territorial inclusion principles are too closely based on the sovereign state model. Autonomous municipalities and provinces may be regarded as self-governing polities within states with their own models of subnational citizenship and the European Union has developed a rudimentary model of supranational citizenship. Voting rights need not be homogeneous across these levels and they need not imitate the rules governing the national level. This seems to me the most plausible interpretation of voting rights in the EU that are acquired automatically with the nationality of a member state, but-different from democratic federations-do not include participation in another constituent entity's national elections. A similar account can be given of the trend toward a local noncitizen franchise. It does not abandon a citizenship condition for the vote, but, quite on the contrary, asserts a distinct conception of local citizenship as a membership acquired through residence in contrast with national citizenship acquired at birth or through naturalization.
Conclusions
Migration is not a new phenomenon. But it is only in our age that the challenge of migration for democratic boundaries has thoroughly undermined traditional ideas of how citizenship, residence, and voting rights should be connected. There are two ways to make sense of the phenomenon of non-citizen and nonresident voting: 1) retain the mental framework of a Westphalian state system with clear cut boundaries between polities and revise our conception of citizenship by disconnecting status from rights and regarding the latter as a global commodity offered by states to mobile populations, or: 2) adapt the republican concept of citizenship as equal membership in a self-governing polity to a world in which political boundaries are increasingly overlapping or nested within each other. The latter route seems more promising not only for explaining why so many democracies have extended electoral rights to non-citizen residents or non-resident citizens, but also for developing democratic principles for how these rights ought to be allocated. 
